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In their book The Phantom Pattern Problem: The Mirage of Big
Data, economist Gary Smith and statistician Jay Cordes
demonstrate with an arsenal of examples derived from such
diverse areas as sports, finance, gambling, astronomy, medicine,
etc., the pervasiveness of so-called “phantom patterns”, i.e.,
coincidental past correlations that have little to no future
predictive value. In addition to illustrating the ease with which
humans can be fooled by these coincidental correlations, the
authors provide many strategies throughout the book to avoid
being misled by phantom patterns. The book is written in a
highly engaging, conversational style, is largely non-technical,
and is therefore suitable for a wide range of audiences. At the
risk of mistakenly identifying phantom patterns within the book
itself, I will attempt to characterize the general structure of The
Phantom Pattern Problem and discuss what to my mind are
some of its most important themes.
​ In the Introduction, Smith and Cordes (henceforth “S&C”)
begin with a case from 2007 in which the Urban Institute, “a
highly regarded Washington think-tank” proposed that America
was experiencing an “iCrime Wave” based on an observed
correlation between the rise in reported murders and the rise in
iPod sales between 2004 and 2006 (1). However, as S&C point
out, this correlation (i) was based on only three years of data, (ii)
was no stronger than the correlation between ice cream sales and
violent crime in the same period, and (iii) vanished shortly
thereafter as the murder rate dropped in 2007. This example
serves as a cautionary tale: even experts can be bewitched by
misleading patterns, a danger that has become more acute in the
era of “Big Data”, an age in which we now have the ability to
gather, process, and analyze massive quantities of data.
​In many ways, the example of the spurious correlation
between murder rates and iPod sales sets the tone for the book.
In the succeeding chapters, the reader will be confronted with
myriad similar examples: cases in which someone mistakenly
infers a causal explanation from merely correlative data, or
perhaps what is worse, cases in which someone tries (and fails)
to predict future events based on past correlations in the absence
of any causal explanation. While S&C examine several themes
that will be of interest to philosophers of science and
epistemologists, e.g., the role of causal knowledge in predictive
inference, the problem of over-fitting the data, the replication
crisis, etc., those readers with mostly abstract, philosophical
concerns may find the quantity of examples unnecessary and
somewhat tedious. For instance, S&C spend about six pages
(180-7) charting the rise and fall of the California-based web
services provider Yahoo! Inc. to illustrate the simple point that a
“CEO is seldom the reason for a company’s success” (187).
Others without a taste for sports might grow weary of the
extensive discussion of the controversial “hot-hands”
phenomenon in basketball (80-6).
​When viewed in a certain light, however, the frequency
with which S&C make recourse to examples of phantom
patterns serves an important, salutary function. As S&C argue in
Chapter 1, our general propensity to recognize patterns in the
world is likely a crucial evolutionary adaptation. As a result, we
are probably “hard-wired to notice patterns” (19). But since
natural selection is not an optimization process, our pattern-
recognition abilities will sometimes misfire, leading us to draw
unfounded conclusions from useless, meaningless, and
misleading patterns. As many of the examples in the book
illustrate, even expert data scientists (26), financial consultants
(35), medical researchers (58), astronomers (68), and economists
(145) can fall into this epistemic trap. One can think of The
Phantom Pattern Problem, then, partly as a kind of
“epistemological self-help” book. To change bad habits, we
often must resort to processes of repetition and reinforcement.
So, even the antecedently skeptical reader—someone who is
already aware of the danger of spurious correlations—will likely
benefit from the many examples explored in the book.
​Of course, S&C not only want to highlight how widespread
these coincidental correlations are, but they also seek to defend
several substantive methodological claims. One of the central
targets of the book—made most explicit in Chapter 5—is the
claim, sometimes heard in data science circles, that soon
predictive analytics algorithms and data mining techniques will
replace or radically alter traditional scientific methodology.
Some of these alleged changes include: (i) a shift from a
“hypothesis-driven” method to a purely “data-driven” method
and (ii) “a move away from the age-old search for causality”,
with a focus instead on correlations, which are thought to be
“good enough” (Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier 2013, 14).
Perhaps as this new paradigm of data-intensive science
develops, the scientist will gradually be replaced by algorithms,
which will at last allow the data “to speak for themselves”
unhindered by human biases.
​Throughout the book, S&C come to the rescue of
traditional scientific methodology by arguing against such lofty
pretensions. While each chapter contains some helpful lessons—
e.g., in Chapter 4, random processes will invariably generate
some striking patterns—perhaps the most philosophically rich
chapter of all is Chapter 2. There, S&C draw a distinction
between “meaningful” and “meaningless” patterns, where
meaningful patterns are ones that have “an underlying causal
explanation” (23). To be sure, data mining techniques can
uncover models that fit past data, but the real test of a model is
the prediction of new data, and according to S&C, “consistently
reliable predictions with fresh data require a causal structure”
(24). Now, S&C do not claim that we need to know exactly what
the correct causal explanation of the correlation is. Perhaps A
causes B, or some third factor C may be the common cause of
both A and B. But if there is no plausible explanation for some
correlation, e.g., the correlation between “avocado prices in San
Francisco in 2015 and Google searches for the Virgo zodiac
sign”, then the correlation should be regarded as “a fleeting
coincidence that is useless for making predictions” (25).
​On S&C’s view, the best way to establish causality is
through randomized controlled trials (RCTs), a method often
regarded as the “gold standard” in medical research (33). Often,
of course, RCTs prove impractical, in which case we must rely
on observational data. In such cases, S&C appeal to the tried-
and-true, hypothetico-deductive method. According to S&C,
instead of resorting to data-mining techniques unmoored from
human expertise in order to uncover patterns in past data, we
ought to stick with traditional scientific method and begin with a
“plausible theory” formulated in advance that we then go on to
test by looking at new data (38). In Chapter 2, S&C motivate the
hypothesis-driven approach over the data-driven approach
primarily by discussing examples in which the latter fails to
predict new data, whereas the former succeeds. Further support
for the hypothesis-driven approach can be provided by a point
that is explored most fully in Chapter 5, which S&C call the
“paradox of big data”: meaningless patterns invariably arise in
large data sets, and since the number of meaningful patterns is
likely fixed, as we gather more data, the probability that any
randomly selected pattern is meaningful radically decreases. In
the Epilogue, S&C introduce Bayesian reasoning, and argue
based on such considerations that the prior probability that a
randomly selected correlation is meaningful will be extremely
low (215-16).
​By and large, I agree with S&C’s main methodological
claims, as well as their critique of the provocative
prognostications of Big Data enthusiasts (e.g., Cabrera 2020).
However, I suspect that the philosopher of science or the
epistemologist reading the Phantom Pattern Problem will find
herself wishing for more clarification or defense at various
junctures. For example, one of S&C’s central points is that
causal knowledge is indispensable for prediction. But what
exactly constitutes causation is a matter of long-standing,
contentious debate (Schaffer 2016). Similarly, as is well-known
among philosophers of science, it is a non-trivial problem to
distinguish, in a principled way, lawlike generalizations, which
are suitable for prediction, from accidentally true
generalizations. Unfortunately, S&C have little to say to about
such matters, leaving the concept of causation largely intuitive.
Additionally, in their defense of the hypothesis-driven approach
over the data-driven approach, S&C implicitly appeal to the
superiority of novel predictions. However, S&C do not provide
much by way of theoretical justification for this assumption,
something which has been questioned by several philosophers of
science (Barnes 2018). Indeed, according to some prominent
accounts of scientific reasoning, such as “abduction” or
“inference to the best explanation” (Lipton 2004), hypotheses
can gain support precisely because of their ability to explain past
data. Those sympathetic with S&C’s position will want such a
justification, if only to ensure that their impression that
prediction trumps accommodation is not itself a phantom
pattern. Despite these philosophical quibbles, overall, I found
the Phantom Pattern Problem a worthwhile and enjoyable read,
and so I happily recommend the book to anyone interested in the
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